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Abstract
This paper proposes and characterises two preference-based choice rules that allow the de-
cision maker to choose nothing if the criteria associated with them are satisfied by no feasible
alternative. Strict preferences are primitive in the first rule and weak preferences in the sec-
ond. Each of them includes the corresponding utility-maximisation theory of rational choice
as a special case. The first one explains changes in the magnitude of context effects observed
in experiments that allow for indecision. The second offers one explanation of experimental
findings suggesting that choice is more likely to be made from small rather than from large
sets. The general conclusion in both cases is that an individual conforms to meaningful and
testable principles of choice consistency whenever assumed to be occasionally indecisive.
A person is defined to be rational if he does the best he can, using reason and all available information,
to further his own interests and values.
Truman Bewley (1986/2002)
A mode of behavior is rational for a given person if this person feels comfortable with it, and is not
embarrassed by it, even when it is analyzed for him.
Itzhak Gilboa (2010)
1 Introduction
Experiments on consumer behaviour have provided empirical support to the
introspectively obvious claim than people facing a choice problem often avoid
choosing when given the opportunity to do so. Reasons for such behaviour in-
clude a positive bias for the status quo, uncertainty about one’s own preferences
regarding the available courses of action, conflict induced by these available op-
tions that is difficult to resolve, a deliberate effort to defer choice that may be
linked to beliefs that the future will bring better opportunities, inaction inertia,
∗I thank Robert Evans, Paola Manzini, Marco Mariotti, Romans Pancs and workshop audiences at Cambridge and
Amsterdam for useful comments.
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and also anticipatory feelings such as regret about a potentially bad choice.1 By
way of the standard convention of a choice correspondence that is well-defined
everywhere in its domain and the core axiom of preference completeness, most
of decision theory predicts that a person will always be able to make a choice
from any set of feasible options. Reconciling theory with the real-world phe-
nomenon of severe indecisiveness of the type that leads to absolutely no choice
being made is nevertheless desirable.
Working within the general framework of abstract static choice theory, this
paper proposes and characterizes two choice rules, together with some of their
special cases, that provide certain preference-based criteria which, if not met by
any feasible alternative in a given set, render the decision maker (DM) inde-
cisive and lead her to avoid choosing from that set. The first rule takes strict
preferences as primitive and predicts that a feasible option will be chosen if and
only if it is preferred to at least one other feasible option and dispreferred by
none, where preferences are generally asymmetric and, as a special case, also
transitive. At the heart of the characterisation is an intuitive weakening of the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), the Reduced WARP, which postu-
lates that if an option x is chosen over an option y when only the two of them
are feasible, then y cannot be chosen from another set where x is also feasible.
This choice procedure provides a formal explanation for the strengthening of
the “attraction effect” and weakening of the “compromise effect”2 that has been
observed in experiments where subjects were freely allowed to abstain from
choosing (Dhar and Simonson (2003)).
The second rule takes weak preferences as primitive and allows for indiffer-
ence to be distinguished from incomparability. A DM here chooses an alterna-
tive from a set if and only if it is preferred or indifferent to all other alternatives
in that set, where preference-or-indifference is a reflexive and transitive relation
that is generally incomplete. Standard WARP is central in the characterisation
of this rule, which provides a framework for thinking about cases where an in-
dividual, although happy to choose an alternative x when only x is feasible or
y when only y is feasible, may nevertheless avoid choosing between x and y.
More generally, this procedure may be suitable in modeling situations where
choices are made from sets with relatively few alternatives but not from sets
with many, a phenomenon that was first documented by Iyengar and Lepper
(2000) and attributed to the increased complexity of the choice problem in the
latter case.
1A detailed survey and discussion of experimental findings on decision avoidance can be found in Anderson (2003).
2Both these effects (discussed below) are robust empirical observations that, according to a common interpretation,
suggest systematic WARP violations in certain contexts.
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Obviously, the two choice rules studied here are not utility-maximising ones.
Instead, it would probably be accurate to label them reason-based, as they are
similar in spirit to the procedures that Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) dis-
cussed when coining this term. In any case, an important theoretical conclusion
to be drawn from the present paper is that to assume that an individual is oc-
casionally indecisive as if she followed a reason-based choice rule such as those
studied here is equivalent to assuming that she obeys meaningful and norma-
tively appealing principles of choice consistency. In particular, it is by no means
necessary that a DM be decisive in order for her to be acting rationally on the
one hand, and it is by all means reasonable to hypothesize that once her indeci-
sion is respected in empirical applications, then any choices she actually makes
will in fact be “more rational” than when it is not. The latter assertion is also
consistent with the well-known argument of Luce and Raiffa (1957) that forcing
a DM to choose “between inherently incomparable alternatives” could subsequently
lead her to intransitive choices. To the extent that intransitivity implies irra-
tionality, upon reversing this argument it becomes clear that not forcing a DM
to choose when she is not actually willing to do so eliminates one source of pos-
sible intransitivities and, by extension, irrationalities. In this respect, the view
taken here differs from that in Mandler (2005) where it is claimed that, despite
preference incompleteness, “agents can be forced to choose from any set of options.”
As far as methodology is concerned, indecisive choice in this paper is mod-
eled by correspondences (and functions) that are empty-valued (i.e. undefined)
at those sets of feasible alternatives where none of the latter meets the prespec-
ified selection criterion. One may argue that, in the broad sense, “no choice”
is itself a choice and therefore one need not resort to partially defined choice
mappings to model indecision. Instead, the argument goes, an explicit alterna-
tive standing for “no choice” may be included in the original domain, making
choice everywhere well-defined by definition. Although both approaches aim to
model exactly the same phenomenon, in this paper where choice is interpreted
in the narrow and pragmatic sense of choice from physical alternatives, the for-
mer approach appears more natural and analytically more convenient. We note
further that implicit support for this point of view also comes from Arrow (1959,
p. 122) where, although this line of research was not actually pursued, we find
that “(choice) is of course not necessarily defined for all possible sets (...)”.
With regard to the relevant literature, it seems that the only paper considering
the possibility of indecisive choice in the same way as we do here is that by
Clark (1995). Although both works share the same view that indecisiveness
and rationality in choice are compatible, Clark (1995) does not axiomatise the
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preference-based choice rules that we do here and does not relate the analysis
with experimental findings. On the other hand, the recent literature on choice
with incomplete preferences (e.g. Mandler (2005, 2009), Masatlioglu and Ok
(2005), Eliaz and Ok (2006), Danan (2010)), which is often axiomatic in nature,
always builds on the assumption that the DM’s set of choosable alternatives is
nonempty for every menu. Thus, it is assumed there that any hesitation caused
by preference incompleteness is somehow resolved once the DM is presented
with a choice task. This, in particular, is also true for the model of status-quo bias
suggested by Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), where the DM’s behaviour is affected
by the presence of a default option in a menu, but her optimal sets are always
nonempty, i.e. either the default option or something preferred to it gets to be
chosen from that menu. The theory proposed in the present paper may also be
interpreted as one modeling a DM who occasionally preserves her status quo,
but one where the latter does not explicitly enter the choice problem in the form
of a default option as in Masatlioglu and Ok (2005).
2 Indecisive Choice and Strict Preferences
We start with some definitions. Let X denote the consumption set, which is
understood to be the universal set of alternatives andM∗ a collection of subsets
of X that necessarily includes all those with exactly two elements. A set M ∈
M∗ is a menu of alternatives that are feasible for the consumer in a particular
situation. A choice correspondence C : M∗  X is a set-valued mapping such
that for all M ∈ M∗, C(M) ⊆ M. If C(M) 6= ∅ for all M ∈ M∗, then C is
a decisive choice correspondence, otherwise it is indecisive. If C is single-valued
whenever non-empty, then it is a choice function and we will use the notation
c : M∗ → X in that case. If, in addition, c is well-defined everywhere inM∗,
then it is a decisive choice function. As far as notational abuses are concerned,
we write C(x, y) = x instead of C({x, y}) = {x} whenever it is understood that
the consumer chooses x from the menu {x, y}. We say that a DM, whose choices
are captured by a choice correspondence C, is behaviourally indecisive at a menu
M ∈ M∗ if C(M) = ∅.
For x, y, z ∈ X, a preference relation  on X is said to be asymmetric if x  y
implies y 6 x, total if x 6= y implies x  y or y  x, and transitive if x  y and
y  z together imply x  z. If x 6 y and y 6 x for some x, y ∈ X, then we write
x ∼̂ y. The relation ∼̂ is reflexive (x ∼̂ x) and symmetric (x ∼̂ y implies y ∼̂ x)
but not transitive in general. Assuming that only trivial indifference exists (i.e.
each alternative is indifferent to itself only), then ∼̂ is to be interpreted as the
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relation that captures the DM’s psychological indecision, i.e. if x ∼̂ y, then she is
psychologically indecisive between alternatives x and y. On the other hand, if
indifference is nontrivial, then it is some reflexive and symmetric subrelation of
∼̂ , with psychological indecision being the irreflexive and symmetric relation
that complements indifference in ∼̂ .
Define the revealed preference relation ∗ associated with a choice correspon-
dence C by x ∗ y if x ∈ C(M) and y ∈ M \ C(M) for some M ∈ M∗. Define
further the reduced revealed preference relation# by x # y if C(x, y) = x. Clearly,
# is asymmetric by definition and contained in ∗, so that x # y implies
x ∗ y, while the converse is not true in general. Our definition of ∗ coin-
cides with the one in Arrow (1959), but other papers assume that # captures
revealed preferences instead.
2.1 Multiple Choosable Alternatives
We first study a choice rule that is based on strict preferences and allows for
none or more than one alternatives to be chosen. Hence, the rule defines an
indecisive choice correspondence C : M∗  X. We start by considering the
following axioms that C will later be assumed to satisfy.
Reduced Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (ReWARP)
If M ∈ M∗, x, y ∈ M and C(x, y) = x, then y 6∈ C(M).
It is straightforward that ReWARP generalises WARP by placing fewer restric-
tions in the hypothesis part of the axiom. More specifically, when formulated
for choice correspondences WARP states that whenever x is chosen over y in
an arbitrary menu M, then y cannot be chosen in another menu M′ where x is
also feasible. By contrast, ReWARP requires that the same conclusion be true
only when x is chosen over y in the particular menu {x, y}. This is intuitive:
When only x and y are feasible, choice is more focused, it cannot be framed
by the presence of third options, it requires fewer cognitive resources and it is
therefore likely to be a more accurate reflection of the consumer’s underlying
attitude towards x and y than it would be had there been more feasible alterna-
tives to choose from. Furthermore, the fact that x is chosen over y in this focused
problem where choosing nothing is also an option adds further support to the
presumption that this behaviour reveals a genuine preference for x over y hence
making it more reasonable to expect that no weak reversal of this preference will
be observed in other choices involving x and y.
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Decision-Driven Choice (DDC)
If M ∈ M∗, x, y1, . . . , yk ∈ M and C(x, y1) = . . . = C(x, yk) = ∅, then x 6∈ C(M).
Suppose that a DM is behaviourally indecisive between an alternative x and ev-
ery alternative in a collection y1, y2, . . ., yk, when considering them in pairs. Two
possible scenarios for this state of affairs is that decision conflict arises in every
pairwise comparison (e.g. in a multi-attribute setting) and that she is unfamiliar
with x and therefore reluctant to make a choice even if she is familiar with each
yi. In the latter case, a cautious DM may prefer to wait until more information
becomes available on x before making a choice in order to avoid missing a po-
tentially good opportunity. Whichever the case, there seems to be no compelling
reason why x should be chosen from the larger menu that includes all these op-
tions, and this is precisely what DDC requires.
Weakly Dominant Choice (WDC)
If M ∈ M∗, x, y, z1, . . . , zm ∈ M, C(x, y) = x and C(x, zi) 6= zi for all i ≤ m, then
x ∈ C(M).
If x is chosen over y from {x, y} and zi is not chosen over x from {x, zi}, i ≤ m,
either because no choice is made or because x is chosen over some zi instead,
then WDC states that x should in fact be chosen from M := {x, y, z1, . . . , zm}
too, if M is itself feasible. The justification is that x has been revealed strictly
better to at least one other element of M in the purest of possible choice situ-
ations involving the two of them (keeping in mind that not choosing anything
was also possible), while it has also been revealed not strictly worse than any
other alternative in M in the same context. WDC postulates that the DM cur-
rently being modeled believes that these two facts provide sufficient reason for
x to be chosen from the larger set that includes all the above alternatives.
Pairwise Choice Transitivity (PCT)
If x, y, z ∈ X, C(x, y) = x and C(y, z) = y, then C(x, z) = x.
PCT is a consistency requirement on pairwise choices. As such, it is more likely
to be satisfied when not choosing is permissible than when it is not, because
when x is chosen over y from {x, y} and y over z from {y, z} in this setting, it
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is understood that x is unambiguously better than y and y than z; if there was
any sort of ambiguity as to which one was better in each case, the DM would
have chosen nothing instead. Thus, expecting that x will also be chosen over
z from {x, z} is, as usual, normatively sound, but in this case it may also be a
requirement that enjoys greater descriptive validity compared to a situation of
forced choice.
Proposition 1
An indecisive choice correspondence C :M∗  X satisfies ReWARP, DDC and WDC
if and only if there exists an asymmetric relation  on X such that for all M ∈ M∗
x ∈ C(M)⇐⇒

x  y for some y ∈ M
and
z 6 x for all z ∈ M.
(1)
Furthermore, C also satisfies PCT if and only if  is, in addition, transitive.
Proof:
Let C : M∗  X satisfy (1). Suppose M ∈ M∗ and x, y ∈ M are such that
C(x, y) = x. It holds that x  y. Let y ∈ C(M). By definition, z 6 y for all z ∈ M.
Therefore, x 6 y too, a contradiction. Next, let M := {x, y1, y2, . . . , yk} ∈ M∗
and C(x, y1) = C(x, y2) = . . . = C(x, yk) = ∅. Clearly, x 6 yi for all i ≤ k. If
x ∈ C(M), then x  yi for some i ≤ k, a contradiction. Finally, suppose M ∈ M∗
and x ∈ M are such that C(x, y) = x for some y ∈ M \ {x} and C(x, z) 6= z for all
z ∈ M \ {x}. It holds that x  y and z 6 x for such y, z ∈ M, from which follows
directly that x ∈ C(M). Therefore, ReWARP, DDC and WDC are satisfied. It is
clear that PCT will also be satisfied if  is transitive.
For the converse implication, suppose that C satisfies the three axioms and
consider the (asymmetric) relation # on X as defined above. Let x ∈ C(M) for
some M ∈ M∗. If y # x for some y ∈ M, then ReWARP is violated. Hence,
no such y ∈ M exists. Suppose next that x # y holds for no y ∈ M. Since it
is now known that y 6# x for all y ∈ M \ {x}, this implies that C(x, y) = ∅ for
all y ∈ M \ {x}. But DDC ensures that x 6∈ C(M), a contradiction. Thus, for all
M ∈ M∗, x ∈ C(M) implies x # y for some y ∈ M and y 6# x for all y ∈ M. In
the other direction, if for some M ∈ M∗ there exists x ∈ M such that x # y for
some y ∈ M and z 6# x for all z ∈ M, then it follows trivially from WDC that
x ∈ C(M). Finally, it is again clear that PCT implies that # is also transitive. 
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In words, under this choice rule the DM selects an alternative from a menu
if she considers that alternative better than at least some other alternative in
that menu and worse than none, the dominance based on an asymmetric or
asymmetric and transitive preference relation. If no feasible option satisfies this
choice criterion, then nothing is chosen and the DM is behaviourally indecisive.
If there are more than one options satisfying the criterion, then any one of them
will be chosen. Importantly, it does not suffice here that an option be undomi-
nated according to the preference relation for it to be choosable (c.f., for instance,
Richter (1971)). At the same time, choosable alternatives need not be preferred
to all non-choosable ones either. Hence, the model is in accordance with State-
ment 2 in Rubinstein and Salant (2008) suggesting that “economists should be also
looking at models in which the observed choice leads to conclusions other than that the
chosen element is always mentally preferred to the other elements in the set.”
Let us now take note of the following facts about Proposition 1, which are
true in its general version that does not require PCT to be satisfied by the choice
correspondence C.
Observation 1:
For all M ∈ M∗, C(M) 6= ∅ implies C(M) ⊂ M. ♦
Indeed, if C(M) = M for some M ∈ M∗, then x ∈ M is such that x  y for some
y ∈ M, which implies y 6∈ C(M) = M, a contradiction. This observation points
to the meaningfulness of the concept of choice under this rule, because an alter-
native is selected only at the cost of another one not being selected. In particular,
there is no way that all elements of a menu can ever be chosen, which is in sharp
contrast to models following the standard, decisive approach to choice that al-
low for this possibility when all alternatives in a menu are undominated with
respect to a preference relation. Although the informational content revealed in
both these cases in terms of how the feasible options compare to each other is
minimal, the two approaches carry quite distinct intuitions and have very dif-
ferent implications.
Observation 2:
For all x, y, z ∈ X, if C(x, y) = ∅ and C(y, z) = y, then y ∈ C(x, y, z).
If, in addition, x 6∈ C(x, z), then y = C(x, y, z). ♦
For the first part, y 6∈ C(x, y, z) implies x  y or z  y. But C(x, y) = ∅ implies
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x ∼̂ y, and C(y, z) = y implies y  z, a contradiction. For the second part, sup-
pose that x ∈ C(x, y, z). Then, since x ∼̂ y, it follows that x  z. But C(x, z) 6= x
implies either z  x or x ∼̂ z, a contradiction. Furthermore, y  z implies
z 6∈ C(x, y, z) too. Thus, if the consumer is indecisive between x and y in {x, y}
and chooses y over z in {y, z}, then she must also choose y from {x, y, z}. If it is
also true that x is not chosen from {x, z} either because z is chosen or because
she is indecisive between them, then y is uniquely chosen from {x, y, z}.
Observation 3:
For all x, y, z ∈ X, if C(x, y) = C(y, z) = C(x, z) = ∅, then C(x, y, z) = ∅. ♦
Suppose x ∈ C(x, y, z). Then x  y and z 6 x or x  z and y 6 x. C(x, y) = x
holds in the first case and C(x, z) = x holds in the latter, a contradiction. Sim-
ilarly, y, z ∈ C(x, y, z) is precluded. Intuitively, if the consumer can’t make
a choice from {x, y}, {y, z} and {x, z} then she won’t be able to choose from
{x, y, z} either. This implication may be thought of as a consistency requirement
for the consumer’s indecision.
Example 1
Suppose X = {w, x, y, z},M∗ = {M ⊆ X : |M| > 1} and the consumer has the
following preferences:
x  w, y  w, y  z,
x ∼̂ y, x ∼̂ z, w ∼̂ z.
If this consumer proceeds according to the rule of Proposition (1), then she will
make choices that are captured by an indecisive choice correspondence C as
follows:
C(w, x) = C(w, x, z) = x,
C(w, y) = C(y, z) = C(x, y, z) = C(w, y, z) = y,
C(x, y) = C(x, z) = C(w, z) = ∅,
C(X) = C(w, x, y) = {x, y}.
Although these choices conform with ReWARP, the fact that y is chosen over
x from {x, y, z} and x is chosen in the presence of y from {w, x, y} shows that
they violate WARP despite there being no -cycles. In fact, it is precisely the
psychological indecision between x and y that leads to WARP violations in this
example. 
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Clearly, with the additional requirement that  in Proposition 1 also be total
we obtain as a special case the standard result that a choice correspondence
C :M∗  X satisfies (1) where is asymmetric, total and transitive, if and only
if C is decisive, single-valued (hence a choice function c) and satisfies WARP. This
is so because once totality is assumed in addition to asymmetry and transitivity,
an alternative x in a menu M is dispreferred by no other alternative y ∈ M if
and only if it is in fact preferred to all other alternatives in M.
Finally, a natural question to ask is whether the axioms of Proposition 1
are equivalent to utility-maximising behaviour once the choice correspondence
is assumed decisive. The following example shows that the answer is “no”,
i.e. even in a decisive-choice setting the implied behaviour is not a utility-
maximising one: Let X = {w, x, y, z}, C(w, x) = x, C(w, y) = y, C(w, z) = z,
C(x, y) = y, C(x, z) = {x, z}, C(y, z) = {y, z}, C(w, x, z) = {x, z}, C(w, x, y) =
y, C(x, y, z) = y, C(w, y, z) = {y, z} and C(X) = {y, z}. These choices satisfy
ReWARP, WDC, PCT and (trivially) DDC. However, the fact that y is chosen
over z from {x, y, z} and z is chosen in the presence of y from {w, y, z} shows
that WARP is violated.
2.2 Attraction and Compromise Revisited
Consider the following three situations of choice from two-attribute alternatives
(these may be lotteries on a zero versus a strictly positive monetary prize, the
two attributes being the amount of the non-zero prize and its probability of be-
ing won). First, the consumer chooses between alternatives x and y, each domi-
nating the other in one attribute. Next, she chooses from a set where to x and y is
added a third alternative z that is dominated in both attributes by y, dominates
x in one attribute and is dominated by x in another. Finally, she chooses from
a set where an alternative z′ is added to x and y such that z′ dominates both x
and y in a fixed attribute and is dominated by both of them in the other, making
y the intermediate option.
Subjects in experiments on individual choice are typically forced to choose
from each one of the above three sets of alternatives. Forced choice in the first
problem usually leads to choice probabilities close to 1/2 for both alternatives
x and y. The attraction effect, originally due to Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982), is
the empirical observation that the choice probability of y in forced-choice exper-
iments is significantly higher in the second problem where it is the asymmetri-
cally dominating alternative, than in the first where it is not. Within the same
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experimental setup, the compromise effect, originally due to Simonson (1989), is
the observation that the choice probability of y in the third problem where it is
the intermediate (or “compromise”) option is again significantly higher than in
the first problem where it is not.
One approach in interpreting these choices is to accept that the representa-
tive individual chooses both x and y in the first case and only y in the second
and third. When these choices are captured by a decisive choice correspondence
Cd that sets Cd(x, y) = {x, y}, Cd(x, y, z) = y and Cd(x, y, z′) = y respectively,
it becomes clear that they violate WARP, since y is chosen over x in the second
and third problems and x is chosen in the presence of y in the first (Figure 1).
q x
q y
q x
q yqz
Attribute 1Attribute 1
Attribute 2 Attribute 2
Cd(x, y, z) = y
Ci(x, y, z) = y
Cd(x, y) = {x, y}
Ci(x, y) = ∅
Cd(x, y, z′) = y
Ci(x, y, z′) = ∅q x
q y
q z′
Attribute 1
Attribute 2
(a) (b) (c)
FIGURE 1
Attraction (b) and compromise (c) with decisive and indecisive choice
Is it actually true, however, that an individual facing the above choice prob-
lems would act “irrationally” in a more realistic situation where she would be
freely allowed to abstain in the event that, for whatever reason, she would be in-
decisive? To answer this question suppose the consumer has a non-total prefer-
ence relation over two-attribute alternatives that is captured by the asymmet-
ric part of the usual partial ordering inR2. It will then be true for her that x ∼̂ y,
x ∼̂ z, y  z, x ∼̂ z′ and y ∼̂ z′. Under the rule studied above these preferences
translate into pairwise choices captured by an indecisive choice correspondence
Ci with Ci(x, y) = ∅ = Ci(x, z), Ci(y, z) = y, and Ci(x, z′) = ∅ = Ci(y, z′).
In view of Observations 2 and 3, these choices also imply Ci(x, y, z) = y and
Ci(x, y, z′) = ∅. In other words, the asymmetrically dominating alternative y is
again uniquely chosen in the second problem whereas neither the compromise
alternative y nor x or z′ is chosen in the third problem.
The reason-based model of Proposition 1 therefore predicts that the attrac-
tion effect will be stronger when the consumer’s indecision is respected. First,
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the choice probability of y when only x and y are feasible is likely to be low
due to the conflicting attribute values which may lead the individual to choose
nothing. At the same time, the choice probability of y in the second problem is
likely to be high because y meets the criteria of choice from {x, y, z} according
to the rule followed (i.e. y dominates z and is undominated by x) while x and
z don’t (z is dominated by y and x dominates neither y nor z). The model also
predicts a weakening of the compromise effect when indecision is allowed. In the
menu {x, y, z′} the consumer is unable to make comparisons in all three pairs of
alternatives, again due to the conflicting attribute values. Since, in particular, no
two alternatives are ordered by strict preference, there is no reason for a choice
to be made from this set if the individual proceeds in the way described above.
Hence, the choice probability of y is predicted to be low in both sets {x, y} and
{x, y, z′}.
These two predictions generated by the above choice rule find empirical
support in the experimental study of Dhar and Simonson (2003), who examined
the effect that allowing subjects to be indecisive has on the magnitude of both
the attraction and compromise effects. More specifically, these authors found
evidence that when abstaining is a permissible option, then the attraction effect
is strengthened and the compromise effect weakened and they did so by com-
paring the difference in choice probabilities of the asymmetrically dominating
and the compromise options between the groups where choice was forced and
those where it wasn’t. The explanation they provided for the moderation of the
compromise effect in this case is that since the intermediate option is likely to be
chosen in situations of preference uncertainty or decision conflict, the no-choice
option serves this purpose even better and is therefore a powerful substitute.
2.3 Unique Choosable Alternatives
When a model of individual choice predicts that more than one alternatives
in a given menu satisfy the optimality criterion for being chosen, it is under-
stood that each one of them will be chosen eventually if the individual is to
face the particular problem sufficiently many times. It is also understood that
at any given time when the choice problem presents itself, the one alternative
chosen among the optimal ones in the end will be selected in a way not cap-
tured formally by the model. Yet, it is often desirable that a theory be able to
make sharper predictions in terms of which option gets to be chosen from a
menu. For that to happen, however, the choice correspondence of the primitive
model must somehow reduce to a choice function. This is the task carried out
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in this subsection, where it is shown how the indecisive choice correspondence
C :M∗  X that was characterised above reduces to an indecisive choice func-
tion c :M∗ → X. For the task at hand, the following axioms will be essential.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)
If M, M′ ∈ M∗, x = c(M), y ∈ M \ {x} and y = c(M′), then x 6∈ M′.
As noted above (and as well-known), a decisive choice function cd : M∗ → X
satisfies WARP if and only if it is rationalised by an asymmetric, total and tran-
sitive preference relation , so that for all M ∈ M∗, cd(M) = x if and only
if x  y for all y ∈ M \ {x}. WARP’s intuitive appeal is arguably greater in
the context of indecisive choice than it is in that of decisive choice, because, as
already argued, it is reasonable to expect that a DM will make choices more con-
sistently if she’s not forced to choose.
Binary Inductive Decisiveness (BID)
If M ∈ M∗, x = c(M) and y ∈ M \ {x}, then c(x, y) 6= ∅.
Suppose that x is chosen over y in some menu. Since the consumer was allowed
not to choose if she wanted to, one may infer from this choice that she was able
to evaluate sufficiently well both x and y. Hence, given that the consumer has
been “revealed informed” over both x and y, it is natural to expect that she
will also be able to make a choice from the menu that consists of exactly x and
y. BID generalizes the α2 property of Sen (1977) when the latter is formulated
for choice functions, by not explicitly requiring x to be chosen from {x, y} if it
has previously been chosen from a set where y was also feasible. If c is decisive,
then WARP implies α2. If c is indecisive, then WARP and BID together imply α2.
Weak Expansion (WEXP)
If M, M′ ∈ M∗ and c(M) = x = c(M′), then c(M ∪M′) 6= ∅.
WEXP says that if the same alternative is chosen in two different menus, then,
for reasons analogous to those above, some choice should be made from their
union too. WEXP is a weak generalisation of the “Expansion” axiom due to
Manzini and Mariotti (2007), which, in particular, requires that the same alter-
native also be chosen from the union of the two original menus, i.e. for M,
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M′ ∈ M∗, C(M) = x = C(M′) implies C(M ∪ M′) = x. If c is decisive, then
WARP implies Expansion. If c is indecisive, then WARP and WEXP together
imply Expansion.
Ternary Inductive Decisiveness (TID)
If M, M′ ∈ M∗, x = c(M), y ∈ M \ {x}, y = c(M′) and z ∈ M′ \ {y}, then
c(x, y, z) 6= ∅.
As with BID, if a consumer chooses x over y in one case, and chooses y over
z in another case, then given that not choosing was also permissible in both
situations, one may interpret these choices as suggestive of the consumer’s fa-
miliarity with all of x, y and z. Once familiarity of the consumer with all three
alternatives x, y and z has been acknowledged, assuming as in TID that some
choice will be made from the menu consisting of exactly these alternatives seems
plausible.
Proposition 2
An indecisive choice function c : M∗ → X satisfies WARP, BID and WEXP if and
only if there exists an asymmetric relation  on X such that for all M ∈ M∗
c(B) = x ⇐⇒ x  y for all y ∈ M \ {x}. (2)
Furthermore, c also satisfies TID if and only if  is, in addition, transitive.
Proof:
Let c : M∗ → X satisfy (2) with respect to an asymmetric . Suppose there
are M, M′ ∈ M∗ such that x = c(M), y ∈ M \ {x}, y = c(B′) and x ∈ B′. Then
x  y and y  x both hold, contradicting the asymmetry of . Thus, WARP
is satisfied. Let there M ∈ M∗ be such that c(M) = x and y ∈ M \ {x}. Since
this implies x  y, it follows that ∅ 6= c(x, y) = x and hence that BID is also
satisfied. Finally, let M, M′ ∈ M∗ have the property that c(M) = x = c(M′). It
is true that x  w for all w ∈ M \ {x} and x  z for all z ∈ M′ \ {x}. Hence,
x  y for all y ∈ M∪M′ such that x 6= y, and therefore x = c(M∪M′) 6= ∅ too.
Thus, WEXP is satisfied. Suppose now that  is also transitive and that there
are M, M′ ∈ M∗ such that x = c(M), x 6= y ∈ M, y = c(M′) and y 6= z ∈ M′.
We have x  y, y  z and, from transitivity, x  z. Hence, x = c(x, y, z) and
therefore TID is also satisfied.
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Suppose now that c obeys WARP, BID and WEXP. Consider the revealed
strict preference relation ∗. WARP ensures that ∗ is asymmetric. Let c(M) =
x for some M ∈ M∗. By definition, x ∗ y for all y ∈ M \ {x}. Conversely,
suppose there exists M ∈ M∗ such that x ∗ y for all y ∈ M \ {x}. BID ensures
that c(x, y) 6= ∅ for all such y and WARP ensures that c(x, y) = x is actually
true. From WEXP then follows that c(M) 6= ∅. If c(M) 6= x, then WARP is vio-
lated. Hence, c satisfies (2). Finally, if TID is also assumed, then x ∗ y, y ∗ z
and WARP together imply x = c(x, y, z) and therefore x ∗ z, so that ∗ is also
transitive. 
Thus, the DM portrayed in Proposition 2 proceeds rather cautiously, com-
pares all possible pairs of alternatives in a menu and chooses the one that is pre-
ferred to all others, if such an alternative exists. If not, then she chooses nothing.
In particular, the general version of the rule does not require the consumer to or-
der (totally or otherwise) each menu according to the preference relation. Thus,
a choice can be made from a menu even if some alternatives cannot be com-
pared and even if preference cycles are also involved. In the strict version that
requires transitivity, of course, preference cycles are ruled out but the former
property continues to apply.
Proposition 2 is a special case of Proposition 1, because if the option that is
chosen from a set is preferred to all others in that set, then it is clearly preferred
to at least one and dispreferred by none. Thus, WARP, BID and WEXP together
imply ReWARP, DDC and WDC, and the first triple together with TID implies
the second together with PCT. The tightness of the axiomatic system formed by
WARP, BID, TID and WEXP is established in the Appendix. We finally note that
in view of the second part of Proposition 2 these four axioms together imply
the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP): if x1 = c(M1), x2 ∈ M1 \ {x1},
x2 = c(M2), x3 ∈ M2 \ {x2}, . . ., xk = c(Mk), then x1 6∈ Mk.
The next example illustrates Proposition 2 in its general version.
Example 2
Suppose X = {a, b, c, d, e} andM∗ = {M ⊆ X : |M| > 1}. Assume further that
the DM has the following preferences on X:
b  a, b  c, b  d,
a  c, c  d, d  a,
a ∼̂ e, b ∼̂ e, c ∼̂ e, d ∼̂ e.
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Following WARP, BID and WEXP (but since  is intransitive, clearly not TID),
she will be observed making the following choices:
C(a, b, c, d) = C(a, b, d) = C(b, c, d) = C(a, b) = C(b, c) = C(b, d) = b,
C(a, c) = a, C(c, d) = c, C(d, a) = d,
C(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M∗.
Thus, she chooses b whenever b is present in a menu and e is not. More specif-
ically, b is strictly preferred to all other alternatives in X except e, which, in
particular, is incomparable by strict preference to all other elements of X. Thus,
since the choice rule of Proposition 2 is dominance-based and e is dominated by
no alternative in X, every effort of choice in its presence is doomed. Finally, one
notes that no choice is made from {a, c, d} either because the preference cycle
in this set ensures that no dominant alternative exists. Thus, preference cycles
constitute one additional source of behavioural indecision.3 
3 Indecisive Choice and Weak Preferences
The choice rule studied in this section is based on weak preferences and there-
fore allows for indifference and psychological indecision to co-exist and be dis-
tinguished. Given the consumption set X, the domain of choice here is a family
of subsets of X, denotedM, that includes all sets up to three elements. The DM’s
weak preference relation on X will be denoted %, with  being the asymmetric
and ∼ the symmetric part of %, capturing strict preference and indifference, re-
spectively. The relation % is complete if x % y or y % x holds for all x, y ∈ X, and
incomplete otherwise. Whenever x 6% y and y 6% x is true for some x, y ∈ X we
write xuprise y and interpretuprise as the relation that captures psychological indecision in
this context. Finally, given a choice correspondence C :M X, the consumer’s
revealed weak preference relation %∗ is defined by x %∗ y if there exists M ∈ M
such that x ∈ C(M) and y ∈ M. We consider now the following axioms for C.
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP)
If M, M′ ∈ M, x ∈ C(M) and y ∈ M \ C(M), then y ∈ C(M′) implies x 6∈ M′.
Arrow (1959) proved that WARP is satisfied by a decisive choice correspondence
on a domain that includes all subsets of X up to three elements if and only if it
3This point is also made in Clark (1995).
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is rationalised by a complete and transitive weak preference relation, so that the
chosen alternatives in every menu coincide with the maximum elements of the
relation in that menu (see Chapter 1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)).
Hence, decisiveness of the choice correspondence and WARP are jointly equiv-
alent to utility maximising behaviour in this context. WARP is undoubtedly the
reference point among the various criteria of choice consistency that have been
proposed. It has already been argued above that it is even more reasonable and
normatively appealing to expect that choice consistency principles in general
(and therefore also WARP) will be satisfied when abstaining is also an option.
Ternary Inductive Decisiveness (TID)
If M, M′ ∈ M, x ∈ C(M), y ∈ M, y ∈ C(M′) and z ∈ M′, then C(x, y, z) 6= ∅.
TID is the axiom introduced in Section 2.3, rewritten here in a way that makes
it applicable to choice correspondences. Notice, however, that a choice has to
be made from {x, y, z} even if x is not chosen over y and y over z, but instead in
the presence of y and z, respectively. The justification of the axiom in the current
setup is analogous to the one in Section 2.3.
Choice from Singletons (CS)
If x ∈ X, then C(x) = x.
CS requires that whenever a DM faces the problem of choosing between a single
alternative, whatever that is, and not choosing anything at all, she does the for-
mer. Clearly, it rules out the possibility that the DM might want to abstain from
choosing if the only feasible alternative is one that happens to be unfamiliar to
her, and as such it is a restrictive axiom in this setting.
Consistent Decisiveness (CD)
If M, M′ ∈ M and M ⊃ M′, then C(M) 6= ∅ implies C(M′) 6= ∅.
It may be argued that it is normatively sound to expect from an individual who
is capable of making a choice from one menu to also be able to choose from
every submenu of that menu. After all, the argument goes, making a choice in
the former situation requires more effort and presupposes that a certain level
of familiarity with all available options exists. Since this familiarity is necessar-
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ily carried over the smaller menu, it seems plausible at first sight that a choice
should be made there too. This is the restriction that CD imposes. Clearly, the
discussion following Proposition 1 demonstrates that there are cases for which
there seems to be no reason that this axiom should be satisfied.
Proposition 3
An indecisive choice correspondence C : M  X satisfies WARP, TID and CS if and
only if there is a reflexive and transitive relation % on X such that, for all M ∈ M
x ∈ C(M) ⇐⇒ x % y for all y ∈ M. (3)
Furthermore, C also satisfies CD if and only if
C(M) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ x % y or y % x for all x, y ∈ M. (4)
Proof:
For the first part, let C be consistent with (3). Since % is reflexive, CS is
trivially satisfied. Consider M, M′ ∈ M with x ∈ C(M), y ∈ M \ C(M), y ∈
C(M′) and x ∈ M′. It holds that x  y and y % x, a contradiction. Hence,
WARP is also satisfied. Finally, let M, M′ ∈ M be such that x ∈ C(M) y ∈ M,
y ∈ C(M′) and z ∈ M′. It is true by assumption that x % y and y % z. Hence,
x % z by transitivity of %, and therefore x ∈ C(x, y, z) 6= ∅, which proves that
TID is satisfied too.
Conversely, let C satisfy WARP, TID and CS, and consider the revealed weak
preference relation%∗ on X defined above. CS ensures that%∗ is reflexive. Sup-
pose x %∗ y and y %∗ z. TID implies C(x, y, z) 6= ∅. If z ∈ C(x, y, z), then
since y %∗ z, WARP implies that y ∈ C(x, y, z) too. But then WARP and x %∗ y
together imply x %∗ z. Hence, %∗ is transitive. By definition of %∗, if x ∈ C(M)
for some M ∈ M, then x %∗ y for all y ∈ M, and therefore (3) is satisfied.
For the second part, let C obey (4) too. Define
F := {M ∈ M : x % y or y % x for all x, y ∈ B},
Fk := {M ∈ F : |M| = k},
F ∗ := argmax{|M| : M ∈ F}.
Suppose that M ∈ F ∗ implies |M| = n. It holds that Fk is well-defined for
k = 1, . . . , n and, from (4), that C(M) 6= ∅ if and only if M ∈ Fk for k ≤ n. Thus,
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if M ∈ Fk and M′ ⊂ M, then M′ ∈ Fk′ with k′ < k, which proves that CD is
satisfied.
Now assume that C is consistent with WARP, TID, CS and CD. Again, it is
known from above that %∗ satisfies (3). Assume that there exists M ∈ M such
that C(M) 6= ∅ and x 6%∗ y, y 6%∗ x for some x, y ∈ M. It holds by definition
that x, y 6∈ C(M) and C(x, y) = ∅. But since {x, y} ⊂ M and C(M) 6= ∅, this
contradicts CD. Conversely, if there is M ∈ M such that w %∗ z or z %∗ w for
all w, z ∈ M, then clearly, since %∗ is a preorder, there exists x ∈ M such that
x %∗ y for all y ∈ M so that C(M) 6= ∅ from (3). This establishes (4). 
Thus, a DM following (3) makes choices that satisfy WARP, TID and CS and
have the property that some alternative is selected from a menu if and only
if this alternative is preferred or indifferent to all others according to a weak
preference relation that is captured by an incomplete preorder. Again, if there
are many such alternatives then one of them will be chosen by some unmod-
eled procedure, whereas no choice is made if none meets this criterion. Hence,
this rule provides the weak-preference analogue of the strong version (which
requires transitivity of ) of the choice rule that is captured in Proposition 2.
Furthermore, if she proceeds according to (4) as well, then her choices also
satisfy CD and the sharp prediction of the rule is that a choice will actually
be made only from those sets that she’s able to completely preorder. In other
words, even if there is one alternative that is weakly preferred to everything
else in a menu, the existence of at least two incomparable options generate be-
havioural indecision. The following property is also possessed by C in this case:
Observation 4
If (4) holds, then C(M) = ∅ and M′ ⊃ M together imply C(M′) = ∅.
Thus, under WARP, TID and CS an indecisive choice correspondence C satisfies
Consistent Decisiveness if and only if it also satisfies Consistent Indecisiveness (CI)
in the above sense. Again, the tightness of WARP, TID, CS and CD is proved in
the Appendix.
Below is an example that illustrates the choice rule in its general form when
only (3) is necessarily satisfied.
Example 3
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Suppose X = {v, w, x, y, z},M = {M : M ⊆ X} and the DM’s preferences are
such that
v  w, v  x, v  y,
v  z, w  x, w  y,
x ∼ y, wuprise z, xuprise z, yuprise z.
Proceeding according to (3), the DM will be observed making the following
choices:
C(M) = v for all M ∈ M such that v ∈ M,
C(w) = C(w, x) = C(w, y) = C(w, x, y) = w,
C(x) = x, C(y) = y, C(z) = z,
C(x, y) = {x, y},
C(M′) = ∅ for all other M′ ∈ M.
Interpret the elements of X as money lotteries with the following properties:
(i) v first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) all the other lotteries in X, (ii)
w FOSD both x and y, (iii) there is no FOSD relation between x and y but the
prize/probability tradeoffs are insignificant, (iv) there is no FOSD relation be-
tween z and each of w, x and y but in all three cases the prize-probability trade-
offs are significant, making her psychologically indecisive (Tversky and Shafir
(1992) report relevant experimental results). It is therefore “rational” that the
DM chooses v from X even though she can’t compare z with w, x and y in that
set. Furthermore, despite choosing w from {w, x, y} and from each subset of that
set, adding z to {w, x, y} again leads to no choice due to the plethora of decision
conflicts generated with its insertion. 
A trivial implication of property (3) of Proposition 3 is that in a situation
where the DM has to choose between x and y and her mental attitudes toward
these alternatives dictate xuprise y, she will choose nothing (i.e. C(x, y) = ∅) despite
the fact that each one of x and y would have been chosen had they been the only
feasible alternatives (i.e. C(x) = x and C(y) = y). It may be the case that
this will seem paradoxical at first sight, but this simple prediction of the model
might be suitable in modeling the following situation reported by Tversky and
Shafir (1992): “A case in point was described to us by Thomas Schelling, who some time
ago had decided to buy an encyclopedia for his children. To his chagrin, he discovered
that two encyclopedias were available in the bookstore. Although either one would have
been satisfactory, he found it difficult to choose between the two, and as a result bought
neither.” Schelling’s story was coupled by experimental results conducted by
Tversky and Shafir that involved CD players, first considered individually and
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then in a setting that generated decision conflict, which pointed to the same
conclusion.
Iyengar and Lepper (2000), in carefully designed field experiments, found
evidence that decision makers are more likely to choose an alternative from a
menu when this menu is “small” and contains relatively few alternatives than
when it is “large” and contains many more. The intuitive explanation they of-
fered for this finding is that the choice task is more complex in the large menu
than in the small one, and the magnitude of complexity is apparently an impor-
tant determinant of (in)decisiveness in choice. Although this connection was
not made in that paper, it may be plausible to hypothesise that one source of the
observed behavioural indecision in these situations is the occurrence of psycho-
logical indecision between alternatives in the large menu, which becomes more
likely as more options are added to a set where no such indecision originally
existed.
More specifically, assuming again a representative subject with a choice cor-
respondence C, the findings of Iyengar and Lepper suggest that C(M) 6= ∅ for
some “small” M and C(M′) = ∅ for some “large” M′ ⊃ M. When the indi-
vidual’s choices satisfy WARP, TID, CS and CD, then both (3) and (4) apply, in
which case it is understood that the individual is able to completely preorder
menu M with % but she is unable to do so for menu M′. So there necessar-
ily exist x, y ∈ M′ such that x uprise y, and either x or y (or both) is feasible in M′
but not in M. Thus, the interpretation of complexity proposed by this model is
based on psychological indecision as captured by the incompleteness of %. Fi-
nally, support to this indecision-based interpretation of complexity comes from
Observation 4 and CI, which ensures that the desirable property of complexity
respecting monotonic increases in the size of the menu is also attained.
The final example is one that highlights the properties of the choice rule in
its strong version where both (3) and 4) are satisfied.
Example 4
Let X = {a, b, c, d, e, f },M = {M : M ⊆ X} and consider the following prefer-
ences for the DM:
a  b, b ∼ c, a  c, c  d, b  d,
a  d, e  f , auprise e, auprise f , buprise e,
buprise f , cuprise e, cuprise f , duprise e, duprise f .
If the DM conforms with WARP, TID, CS and CD, these preferences lead to the
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following choices:
C(a) = C(a, b) = C(a, c) = C(a, d) = C(a, b, c) = C(a, b, d) =
= C(a, c, d) = C(a, b, c, d) = a,
C(b) = C(b, d) = b,
C(c) = C(c, d) = c,
C(d) = d,
C(e) = C(e, f ) = e,
C( f ) = f ,
C(b, c) = C(b, c, d) = {b, c},
C(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M.
So this DM is able to choose from {a, b, c, d}, {e, f } and each one of their sub-
menus because she can completely preorder all of these with %, which is nev-
ertheless an incomplete preorder in X. Adding an element of the first menu to
the second and vice versa leads to indecision-based complexity and ultimately
to no choice. 
4 Conclusion
This paper proposed and axiomatised two preference- and reason-based choice
rules, together with some of their special cases, that allow the decision maker to
choose nothing in the event that none among the feasible alternatives satisfies
the selection criterion associated with these rules. This theory can accommodate
experimental findings that cannot be explained by models assuming decisive-
ness of choice. It also formalises in very specific ways the idea that decisiveness
is not a necessary condition for rationality. In particular, both rules rely either
on WARP itself or on its intuitive generalisation, ReWARP, along with some
other behavioural axioms that are generally weak and intuitive. As far as future
work is concerned, a dynamic theory of individual choice as well as social choice
when agents are rationally indecisive are likely to be two interesting problems.
Appendix
Claim 1
For an indecisive choice correspondence C : M∗  X each of ReWARP, DDC, WDC
and PCT is independent of the other three.
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Proof:
Suppose X = {w, x, y, z} andM∗ = {M ⊆ X : |M| > 1}.
C1 below satisfies ReWARP, DDC and WDC but violates PCT.
C1(x, y) = x, C1(y, z) = y, C1(x, z) = ∅,
C1(x, y, z) = C1(w, x, y) = C(X) = x,
C1(w, y, z) = y,
C(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M∗.
C2 below satisfies ReWARP, DDC and PCT but violates WDC.
C2(w, x) = C2(w, y) = w, C2(w, x, y) = ∅,
C2(w, x, z) = w,
C2(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M∗,
C3 below satisfies ReWARP, WDC and PCT but violates DDC.
C3(w, x) = C3(w, y) = ∅, C3(w, x, y) = w,
C3(x, y) = x, C3(y, z) = y, C3(x, z) = x,
C3(x, y, z) = x,
C3(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M.
C4 below satisfies DDC, WDC and PCT but violates ReWARP.
C4(w, x) = w, C4(x, y) = x, C4(w, y) = w,
C4(w, z) = C4(x, z) = C4(y, z) = ∅,
C4(w, x, y) = {w, x},
C4(w, x, z) = C4(w, y, z) = w,
C4(x, y, z) = {x, y},
C4(X) = {w, x, y}.

Claim 2
For an indecisive choice function c :M∗ → X each of WARP, BID, TID and WEXP is
independent of the other three.
Proof:
Suppose X andM∗ are as in the proof of the previous claim.
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c1 below satisfies BID, TID and WEXP but violates WARP.
c1(x, y) = c1(w, y) = y, c1(w, x, y) = x,
c1(w, x) = c1(w, z) = c1(w, x, z) = w,
c1(x, z) = x, c1(y, z) = z, c1(x, y, z) = x,
c1(w, y, z) = w, c1(X) = ∅.
c2 below satisfies BID, TID and WARP but violates WEXP.
c2(x, y) = c2(x, z) = x, c2(x, y, z) = ∅,
c2(x, w) = c2(w, z) = c2(x, w, z) = w,
c2(w, y) = y, c2(y, z) = c2(w, y, z) = z,
c2(w, x, y) = c(X) = ∅.
c3 below satisfies BID, WARP and WEXP but violates TID.
c3(w, y) = y, c3(y, z) = z, c3(w, y, z) = ∅,
c3(x, y) = c3(x, z) = c3(x, y, z) = x,
c3(w, x) = c3(w, z) = c3(w, x, z) = w,
c3(w, x, y) = c3(X) = ∅.
c4 below satisfies TID, WARP and WEXP but violates BID.
c4(w, x) = c4(w, z) = ∅, c4(w, x, z) = w,
c4(w, y) = y, c4(y, z) = c4(w, y, z) = z,
c4(w, x) = c4(x, z) = c4(x, y, z) = x,
c4(w, x, y) = c4(X) = ∅.

Claim 3
For an indecisive choice correspondence C :M X each of WARP, ID, CS and CD is
independent of the other three.
Proof:
Let X = {w, x, y, z} andM = {M : M ⊆ X}.
C1 below satisfies WARP, CS and ID but violates CD.
C1(M) = w, if w ∈ M,
C1(x) = x, C1(y) = y, C1(z) = z,
C1(x, y) = C1(y, z) = C1(x, z) = C1(x, y, z) = ∅.
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C2 below satisfies WARP, CD and CS but violates ID.
C2(w) = w, C2(x) = x, C2(y) = y, C2(z) = z,
C2(w, x) = C2(w, y) = C2(w, z) = C2(w, x, z) = C2(w, y, z) = w,
C2(x, y) = x, C2(y, z) = y, C2(x, z) = z,
C2(w, x, y) = C2(x, y, z) = C(X) = ∅.
C3 below satisfies WARP, CD and ID but violates CS.
C3(x) = x, C3(y) = y, C3(z) = z,
C3(x, y) = C3(x, z) = C3(x, y, z) = x,
C3(y, z) = y,
C(B) = ∅ for all other B ∈ M.
C4 below satisfies CD, CS and ID but violates WARP.
C4(w) = w, C4(x) = x, C4(y) = y, C4(z) = z,
C4(w, x) = w, C4(x, y) = x, C4(w, y) = y,
C4(w, x, y) = x,
C4(M) = ∅ for all other M ∈ M.

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